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Disruptive Innovation and Tsunami Stressors
Jon M. Garon*
This article is part of a series of book excerpts from The Entrepreneur’s Intellectual Property &
Business Handbook, which provides the business, strategy, and legal reference guide for start-ups and
small businesses.

1.

Disruptive is More than Different.

Some stressors are larger than others. In 1997, Clayton Christensen advanced the concept of
“disruptive innovation,” focusing on technological change that transformed business and often
undermined industry incumbents in favor of start-up competitors.1 Entrepreneurial companies have
embraced both the term and the concept, but it has grown considerably to encompass virtually any
incumbent market threat. Whereas sustaining technologies improve performance, increase margins,
and build customer relations, disrupting technologies often start out as unusable innovations that
underperform, cost too much, or focus on a different customer base. Disruptive innovations
essentially redefine the value proposition for the customer, which may disintermediate the relationship
between vendor and customer, opening the door to competition.
Disrupted markets are highly volatile, with corporate innovators attempting to capture the market
in a pattern not unlike that of surfers competing to catch a wave. Many entrepreneurs make a run at
the wave but most fall back as the successful entrant captures the dominant position and rides (or
falls) based on talent and technique. Unlike open markets, surfers have rules of etiquette to determine
who has priority. These same unwritten social and cultural rules sometimes apply to regulated markets
and oligopolies as well.
A truly disruptive market is one where the existing model unravels when a competing product or
service transitions the market from one business model into a substantially new model. The
photographic film industry has seen such an example. Kodak and Polaroid dominated instant
photography for generations. Kodak, in particular, had significant research and development in new
technologies. By 1975, Kodak’s engineer, Steven Sasson, had developed the charge-coupled device,
which serves as the basis for the modern digital camera.2 These efforts, however, did not match the
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resolution quality of photographic film, and Kodak was primarily a film company rather than an
equipment manufacturer. To expand its efforts in digital cameras would generate small returns, and
the success would cost them substantial losses. This is the classic dilemma leading companies are
facing for truly disruptive innovations. What company wishes to invest in its own demise?
As Kodak and other existing camera and film companies watched from the sidelines, digital
cameras grew to dominate the industry in part because they filled the incongruity between how the
photographic experience should operate and how it actually operated. Consumers wanted to know
immediately if their photographs were satisfactory, to easily share photographs, and to avoid delays in
the processing. For most events, convenience was a higher priority than quality, which kept the digital
market growing. At the moment digital pictures became a reasonable substitute for film-based
pictures, the market became wholly disrupted and the existing markets were thrown into disarray.
The pattern is not new. IBM refused to invest meaningfully in personal computers because its
mainframe computer business was too superior. By the time the convenience of personal computers
for the home and small business market became established, IBM had been sidelined. Early ship
manufacturers saw little value in steam engines because they did not have the range to cross oceans.
The convenience of stable power supplies was used by riverboats instead, and by the time the ocean
line companies realized that improvements to the engines in riverboats provided the range needed for
international voyage, the industry had moved to a different group of manufacturers.
Today, a similar transition is occurring with electric, hybrid, and gasoline engine automobiles.
There are a number of companies that recognize that the convenience of electric engines will
eventually compete with and then replace gasoline engines. Dominant automakers are slow to
introduce these cars into the marketplace because they are not perfect substitutes for the gasoline
vehicles today. But a different customer base, urban and short-distance drivers, are clamoring for the
convenience and environmental benefits. Gas stations and commercial real estate developers are
generally ignoring the looming crisis in their business model. By the time electric cars can compete
with gasoline cars for the entire automobile market, the car manufacturers that have not invested in
these disruptive innovations will be left behind.
To be successful in a disruptive market, a company has only two strategies available to it. The first
strategy is to have the capital resources to lose money for many years as the technology and market
mature. Rich, serial entrepreneurs can sometimes bring new markets into existence through their deep
pockets and long-term vision.
The second strategy is to earn money for the disruptive, but non-competitive technology by
supplying the product to a market that the existing industry does not support. Ironically, the PC
provides this example. IBM characterized the PC as a toy competing in the mainframe computer
market. Had it instead developed the PC as an innovative extension of its IBM Selectric typewriter, it
may have understood the tremendous potential for a word processor that could store and retrieve the
documents typed on the machine. Even though early PCs were little more than smart typewriters,
IBM misunderstood the potential in the machines and did nothing to own the technology used to
launch its fiercest competition—disrupting both IBM’s lead in computing and in the office machine
market.

2.

Market Leadership Rather than Market Disruption.

Unfortunately, the power of the term disruptive innovation has led to its overuse and
misunderstanding. Any business challenge can be labeled disruptive innovation. One example of this
also flows from the innovations at IBM.
IBM had been a market leader in office technology for decades when it began to develop the IBM
Selectric during the 1950’s. It launched in 1961, immediately exceeding its predicted output by four
times its market predictions. Instead of meeting its goal of selling 20,000 units in its first year, the IBM
Selectric instead sold over 80,000 units. While a tremendous hit, the Selectric failed to be a disruptive
innovation because it did not change the way in which typewriters were purchased and sold, the
ancillary industries associated with office supplies, or any other aspects of typing or office
management. The Selectric’s use of a sphere for the characters rather than a basket of moving arms
made the machine faster and required it to have less maintenance. The interchangeability of the ball
allowed for the user to adopt additional fonts and even mathematical symbols. But it was still just a
typewriter.
Had a few different choices been made, the entire history of the technology might have changed.
IBM computer scientist Bob Bemer is recognized as a pioneer in the establishment of ASCII—
American Standard Code for Information Interchange—the alphabet of modern computing.
Bemer reviewed the Selectric typewriter’s specifications. To him, the Selectric would make a
natural computer keyboard. He argued that the type ball should be designed to carry 64
characters required for ASCII, rather than the typewriter standard 44. That would make it
relatively easy to convert the Selectric for computer input. The response, as Bemer remembers
it, was dismissive. As a result, the Selectric never spoke ASCII, instead employing a unique
code based on the tilt and rotate commands to the golf ball. While Bemer viewed this as his
failure, engineers continued to rig Selectric typewriters to function as the first generation of
computer keyboards and input devices.3
Although Selectrics were sometimes rigged to be used as computer input devices, the opportunity
to design them to the standard specification was lost. Had Selectrics been able to be used as both an
input and printer for early PCs, then the proprietary technology of IBM would have defined the early
PC age, and the conversion of thousands of businesses already owning Selectrics would have been a
natural progression. Instead, the Selectric was discontinued in 1986, a victim of the PC revolution and
the leadership’s failure to understand how to adapt to the disruptive innovation transforming its
industries.
A second example of non-disruptive industry success is the Procter & Gamble Swiffer Mop.
Introduced in the late 1990’s, the Swiffer underperformed on measures of durability and cleaning
power when compared to conventional dry and wet mops. The ease of use, however, “convert[ed]
many non-moppers and infrequent moppers into frequent floor cleaners.”4
The introduction of the Swiffer Mop was often characterized as an example of disruptive
innovation because Swiffer’s convenience gained it market share even though it is not as effective as
traditional mops.
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The Swiffer Mop’s success, however, was entirely predictable and not particularly disruptive.
At a time when products were increasingly disposable and geared toward convenience, the
Swiffer Mop followed the trend. The Swiffer Mop—which avoids the cleaning of mop heads—
provides the ultimate in mopping convenience.
Procter & Gamble did not need to change its strategy of selling mops through wholesale and retail
channels; it merely added another mop brand to its product array. It did not face disintermediation of
its traditional distribution because of the Swiffer. The idea of the mop did not change. And the
companies which lost market share to P&G lost market share to an existing competitor in the same
market space.

3.

Market “Forking” and Self-Inflicted Disruption.

An intermediately sized form of market disruption can be predicted from a pattern common to
the nature of market evolution. In many markets, manufacturers begin to differentiate themselves by
adding small enhancements and features. These differentiate the products from those of the
competition. Some of these improvements have no intellectual property protection, while the more
valuable additions often do. For example, these improvements may be protected by patents. At other
times, these changes are less significant but tie directly into the trademarks associated with the goods
or the celebrity names associated with the marketing. Improvement by improvement, the profitability
increases for the seller and the cost increases for the buyer.
At a certain point in the product evolution, however, these incremental improvements begin to
price the product too high for a segment of the marketplace. By segmenting the market in this way,
the producer of the high-cost goods creates a new market for a low-cost provider. As Christensen
describes it, “[t]his follows a cycle that creates the innovators’ dilemma: firms add new product/service
attributes to attract the most demanding customers then these attributes are imitated by competitors,
forcing innovators to add still more product/service attributes.”5 The very quality and cost create
opportunities for low-cost competitors to cannibalize part of the market.
For years, U.S. automobile manufacturers understood this innovator’s dilemma. Each of the big
three auto companies would have brands known for different price points. Even today, GM operates
Chevrolet as a lower-priced company, Buick for its middle market, and Cadillac for its upscale line.
Toyota, Nissan, and Honda have luxury lines of Lexus, Infiniti, and Acura respectively to stay
competitive in both the upper and lower segments of their own markets.
The innovator’s dilemma has many solutions. In The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid, C.K.
Prahalad painstakingly identifies the cultural, social, and economic assumptions that shaped forty-five
years of ineffectual policy regarding poverty in India.6 Prahalad identifies the fallacy that “[t]he
dominant assumption is that the poor have no purchasing power and, therefore, do not represent a
viable market.”7 He documents that the poor of China and India hold tremendous purchasing power,
perhaps as much as $8 trillion. Because the poor are forced to pay a premium for all the services they
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receive “from rice to credit” of “5 to 25 times what the rich pay for the same services,” unlocking this
poverty penalty would generate a huge economic opportunity.8
Procter & Gamble demonstrated the reality of this opportunity, using ethnographic studies to
quantify that eighty percent of the public in India wash their clothes by hand.9 Procter & Gamble
redesigned a product to be less astringent on hands while still effective on clothing and priced to
undercut competing products that used harsher chemicals. By formulating the product to the Indian
hand-wash market, Procter & Gamble simultaneously improved service to its customers and
developed a new market.
Even more interesting was the foray into this market by Intuit, makers of TurboTax.10 Looking to
develop remote tax preparation tools for the subsistence farmers of India, their first-hand experience
with the farmers led Intuit to develop “Mobile Bazaar, a simple text-messaging-based marketplace
connecting buyers and sellers.”11 Subscribing farmers benefited because the quality of their
information improved and their access to pricing data expanded. Using the simple tool, “half the
farmers were able to increase their prices by more than 10% . . . [and] [w]ithin a year of launch, Mobile
Bazaar had 180,000 subscribing farmers, most of them acquired by word of mouth. They report that,
on average, the service boosts their prices by 16%.”12
Intuit experienced a highly disruptive development cycle for both the company and country. It
entered a market for one product but ultimately developed an entirely different product to meet a
need it had not known existed. On the other hand, the product innovation of Procter & Gamble was
merely incremental, not profound disruptive innovation—unless compared with forty-five years of
stagnation in India and industry’s systemic failure to address a market comprised of four billion poor
people across the globe.13 Both Procter & Gamble and Intuit have made a difference and expanded
their business.
In this context, any effort to expand into this market is profoundly disruptive. It also serves as a
stark reminder that a marketplace of four billion people with an incalculable collective bargaining
power was ignored for decades. But this narrative has shifted and the race to meet these global needs
has just begun. The bottom of the pyramid is replete with opportunity for entrepreneurs who can
embrace profound disruptive change merely by overlooking the historical blinders created by
prejudice, parochialism, and presumption.

4.

Timing of Success in a Disrupted Market.

Despite common misconceptions to the contrary, there is not necessarily a first-mover advantage.
Timing is a critical factor, but timing merely explains why the successful entrant shaped the response
of the pack. If a competitor in the market has the ability to control essential patents, hire key personnel
and know-how, develop brand goodwill that shifts consumer behavior, or better predict the
manifestation of the disruption, that entrepreneur will outperform the other entrants. The entrant’s
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success drives economically inefficient competitors out of the competition and triggers a shakeout. In
retrospect, that entrant is seen as having timed its entrance precisely, but in reality, it was the assets
brought to bear on the disruption that shaped the timing.
This is not to say that timing does not matter. The cost of participation appears to have a saddlecurve distribution. Early entrants must bring with them the research, development, and awareness to
participate, resulting in relatively high entry costs. Early entrants also face the challenge of waiting a
long time before they receive any meaningful return, which reflects on both the cost of the capital
investment and the political problem of assuaging investors. The late entrants are competing against
an increasingly mature market, which requires greater budgets to acquire technology and larger
marketing outlays to acquire market share. The well-timed entrant can reduce the overhead of
participation (somewhat) by jumping in at the point that the technology is maturing but before the
market is solidifying.
In addition, this timing model assumes the entrant is not affecting the shape of the innovation or
the competition. To shape the development curve, an entrant must have the right assets: patents,
know-how, brands, and pattern-recognition of the disruption. Moreover, all the tools for success are
affected by timing. Move too early and these tools may not be ready to bring to bear; move too late
and a competitor may capture these assets. Thus, understanding the pattern is an incremental tool to
manage the competition, but a company must bring the right assets to the competition to be
successful.

